imra.org.il
The development that, more than any other, should set off warning bells in
Jerusalem, is the unilateral action taken by the Egyptians in Sinai during
the past few days.
While Israel is prattling itself to death on the Iranian issue, the decision
makers here are choosing not to respond to the fact that Egypt is moving
forces into Sinai, contrary to the terms of the peace agreement. It is
possible that the Israeli side prefers to take this lying down for now.
...
The Egyptians ...have yet to launch the more difficult and complicated
campaign to uproot the armed militants in central Sinai and to act against
the tunnels from Sinai into the Strip.
Israel should understand who is commanding Egypt's forces in Sinai
After President Morsi's defense chiefs shakeup, it's crucial that we
understand the ideology and the goals of those who are commanding these
troops, namely, the Muslim Brotherhood.
By Avi Issacharoff Haaretz Aug.17, 2012 | 9:05 AM
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/israel-should-understand-who-is-commanding-egypt-s-forces-in-sinai.premium-1.458944
The fears in Israel of a deterioration in relations with Egypt, following
President Mohammed Morsi's removal from office of the head of the Supreme
Military Council, Hussein Tantawi, and armed forces chief Sami Anan, are
both premature and exaggerated. Security coordination between the two
countries will continue; there is nothing to indicate that it's about to
come to an end. In fact, Israel-Egypt security coordination is good and in
some cases, even very good. Not surprisingly perhaps, it becomes
increasingly effective at the lower levels of division and brigade
commanders, and so forth. While this is also largely true at the higher
levels, there there are some causes for concern.
To begin with, President Morsi is a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood,
an organization that perceives Egypt's relations with Israel as an
unavoidable necessity, not a particularly happy circumstance. Eighty-four
years after its founding, and 64 years after Israel's establishment, the
Muslim Brotherhood still refuses to use the word "Israel." Morsi's legal
adviser, Mohammed Gadallah, referred not to Israel, but to "the entity,"
when he said this week that the president will reexamine the Camp David
accords. The new defense minister, General Abdellatif Sisi, and the new
chief of staff, General Sidki Sobhi, owe their appointments to Morsi and so
can be expected to assume a different attitude vis-a-vis Israel, in
comparision with the relatively positive approach that characterized their
predecessors (who were trying to placate their boss, Hosni Mubarak ).
The status of the two new appointees in relation to the president also
differs from that held by Tantawi. It's a good bet that a working meeting
between Morsi and the former head of the military council was quite
different from a meeting between Morsi and the current two top generals. In
short, Sisi possesses neither the status nor the ability to say no to Morsi.
On top of all this, there is the general atmosphere of enmity toward Israel
that prevails among the Egyptian public. The new generals, in contrast to
their predecessors, understand that in the era of the Arab Spring, the
public is a full partner to decision-making in the country, and they feel
the public's hate of Israel.
Actually, both Sisi and Sobhi have been in contact with the Israeli side
more than once, and are well acquainted with their counterparts in Tel Aviv.
This is especially true of Sisi, who was until recently the commander of
Military Intelligence. Both of them acquired an advanced military education
in the West (in Britain and the United States ). However, they are not part
of the group of generals that viewed the Israelis as full partners. At no
stage, not even during the Mubarak period, did Sisi and Sobhi forge ties of
friendship with the Israeli side.
Seven years ago, Sobhi, who until this week was the commander of Egypt's
Third Army, attended the U.S. Army War College (as did Sisi ). In his
master's thesis in strategic studies, he recommended that the United States
withdraw its forces from the Middle East and end what he considered its
one-sided policy regarding Israel's security interests. In many senses, that
thesis (which was first publicized on Twitter by someone called "Arabist" )
reflects the new chief of staff's regional approach.
According to Sobhi, the United States, ironically, defines its Mideast
policy around Israel, which is conducting an "illegitimate occupation." He
argued that the United States must contend with hostile and emotional
response from Arab states, because of its policy on Israel. "The Islamic
religion is strongly interlinked to various degrees with the functioning of
most Arab governments and their respective societies," Sobhi wrote.
His recommendation, seven years ago: The United States should tighten its
relations with Iran. But much has changed in the region since 2005, and it
is not because of what Sobhi wrote that the cooperation between the various
sides will be transformed.
No one noticed
The development that, more than any other, should set off warning bells in
Jerusalem, is the unilateral action taken by the Egyptians in Sinai during
the past few days. Israel had prior knowledge about, and consented to, the
use of some of the military reinforcements that were sent into the peninsula
as well as the warplanes that were employed. But Egypt took action above and
beyond what both sides agreed the Egyptian military needed to do in order to
operate throughout Sinai. It turns out that additional forces were sent in,
almost without anyone noticing, and without Jerusalem's agreement.
While Israel is prattling itself to death on the Iranian issue, the decision
makers here are choosing not to respond to the fact that Egypt is moving
forces into Sinai, contrary to the terms of the peace agreement. It is
possible that the Israeli side prefers to take this lying down for now. In
the final analysis, the purpose of the movement is a positive one: to do
battle against the nests of extremist terrorists who are attacking Egyptian
troops, but have also tried, and will try again, to perpetrate terrorist
attacks against Israeli targets as well.
At the same time, there is apprehension about the trickle of Egyptian forces
into Sinai in numbers that will ultimately be unacceptable to Israel. This
is creating facts on the ground. After sending in these forces, Cairo might
officially request that they be allowed to stay. It's a good guess that a
negative Israeli reply will not exactly prompt the new Egypt or its leader
from the Muslim Brotherhood to quickly remove the troops.
In the meantime, there are a growing number of conspiracy theories being
hatched in Cairo regarding Morsi's decision to dismiss Tantawi. The website
of the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masriyoun reported that Morsi moved quickly to
depose Tantawi because the general was planning a coup for the end of
August. In this case, however, the truth is probably simpler. Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood are out to complete their takeover of the January 2011
revolution.
A blog posted on Wednesday by Jonathan D. Halevi (in both Hebrew and
English ) on the website of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
presented a document purportedly written by an intelligence body in Egypt
and uploaded by an Egyptian site. It claims that the Muslim Brotherhood was
in fact a central player in planning the demonstrations and the revolution,
with the aim of buttressing its standing. The document is said to be dated
January 28, 2011, three days after the start of the demonstrations, and
Morsi's name appears in it repeatedly, as a key figure in planning the
protests and confrontations against the old regime.
The Supreme Muslim Council was a bone in the craw of the Muslim Brotherhood,
and Morsi's move against the two generals removed the final obstacle for the
movement. Although the deputy general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Khairat al-Shater (a former candidate for the country's presidency ) ,
continued to claim this week that the lengthy power failures in Egypt were
part of a domestic plot by those who sought to undermine the revolution, in
many senses there is actually one remaining power center in Egypt today: the
Muslim Brotherhood. The military council, which challenged the movement, has
ceased to exist.
In the end, the movement's supporters will argue, it recouped the powers
that are part and parcel of the presidency. However, just before Western
media outlets begin to declare their admiration for Egypt's magnificent
democracy, it needs to be said that the direction in which the Muslim
brotherhood is leading the country hardly resembles classic democracy. Most
of the media, fearing a confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood, are
parroting the line espoused by the new president. On Wednesday, a
journalist, Yussef al-Qaid, claimed that the new editor of Al Akhbar, a
Muslim Brotherhood appointee, had prevented him from publishing an article
critical of the movement. King Mubarak is gone. Long live King Morsi.
Tip of the dune
Ten days after the start of the Egyptian army's operation in the Sinai
Peninsula, it is shaping up as an exceptional event in Egyptian terms. It is
the most extensive activity by the army in Sinai since the Yom Kippur War 39
years ago.
The Egyptian forces that were sent into northeastern Sinai are operating
with determination in the area of El-Arish and Sheikh Zuweid. They have
killed or arrested a number of wanted individuals belonging to groups
identified with global jihad and also extremists among the local Bedouin
population.
The activity has included battles in the region of the village of al-Jourah
and the confiscation of weapons. The Egyptian authorities have also,
apparently, been able to reach agreements with the sheikhs and other leaders
of the tribal groups in northeastern Sinai about the need take action
against extremists who harmed Egyptian security and killed 17 Egyptian
soldiers in an attack near the Kerem Shalom checkpoint.
However, this is only the tip of the sand dune. The Egyptians are now
focusing their activity in the area of the border with the Gaza Strip. They
have yet to launch the more difficult and complicated campaign to uproot the
armed militants in central Sinai and to act against the tunnels from Sinai
into the Strip. For the time being (and it needs to be emphasized that this
is only the start of the operation ), the Egyptian army is carrying out
actions that are aimed mainly at pacifying domestic public opinion and
creating a semblance of activity.
This is the case with the tunnels, several of which east of the Rafah
crossing were demolished by the Egyptian army (these tunnels are not
considered part of the Hamas network of subterranean passages ). The same
holds true for the searches being carried out in El-Arish and Sheikh Zuweid.
The first goal was to purge the area of terrorist nests.
The question that remains open is what will happen in the second stage. What
will the Egyptians do about the challenge of the tunnels, and how will they
deal with the major problem of central Sinai?
For the moment, at least, the most urgent problem is Jebel Halal. This hilly
region, some 70 or 80 kilometers from El-Arish, was thought by some
archaeologists to be the site of Mount Sinai.
The hills slope into Wadi el Arish and are in the area controlled by the
Tarabin Bedouin tribe. Probably dozens, if not hundreds, of armed
individuals are taking shelter there. The area is studded with nooks and
crannies, burrows and caves, which evoke the Tora Bora caves in eastern
Afghanistan. Armored vehicles cannot be deployed there, and aerial strikes
are unlikely to penetrate the thick cave walls. The only choice is for the
Egyptian army to send in infantry, and steel itself for a large number of
casualties. Until that happens, we will continue to be witness to a war of
attrition between the army and the Islamists.
Jerusalem, is the unilateral action taken by the Egyptians in Sinai during
the past few days.
While Israel is prattling itself to death on the Iranian issue, the decision
makers here are choosing not to respond to the fact that Egypt is moving
forces into Sinai, contrary to the terms of the peace agreement. It is
possible that the Israeli side prefers to take this lying down for now.
...
The Egyptians ...have yet to launch the more difficult and complicated
campaign to uproot the armed militants in central Sinai and to act against
the tunnels from Sinai into the Strip.
Israel should understand who is commanding Egypt's forces in Sinai
After President Morsi's defense chiefs shakeup, it's crucial that we
understand the ideology and the goals of those who are commanding these
troops, namely, the Muslim Brotherhood.
By Avi Issacharoff Haaretz Aug.17, 2012 | 9:05 AM
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/israel-should-understand-who-is-commanding-egypt-s-forces-in-sinai.premium-1.458944
The fears in Israel of a deterioration in relations with Egypt, following
President Mohammed Morsi's removal from office of the head of the Supreme
Military Council, Hussein Tantawi, and armed forces chief Sami Anan, are
both premature and exaggerated. Security coordination between the two
countries will continue; there is nothing to indicate that it's about to
come to an end. In fact, Israel-Egypt security coordination is good and in
some cases, even very good. Not surprisingly perhaps, it becomes
increasingly effective at the lower levels of division and brigade
commanders, and so forth. While this is also largely true at the higher
levels, there there are some causes for concern.
To begin with, President Morsi is a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood,
an organization that perceives Egypt's relations with Israel as an
unavoidable necessity, not a particularly happy circumstance. Eighty-four
years after its founding, and 64 years after Israel's establishment, the
Muslim Brotherhood still refuses to use the word "Israel." Morsi's legal
adviser, Mohammed Gadallah, referred not to Israel, but to "the entity,"
when he said this week that the president will reexamine the Camp David
accords. The new defense minister, General Abdellatif Sisi, and the new
chief of staff, General Sidki Sobhi, owe their appointments to Morsi and so
can be expected to assume a different attitude vis-a-vis Israel, in
comparision with the relatively positive approach that characterized their
predecessors (who were trying to placate their boss, Hosni Mubarak ).
The status of the two new appointees in relation to the president also
differs from that held by Tantawi. It's a good bet that a working meeting
between Morsi and the former head of the military council was quite
different from a meeting between Morsi and the current two top generals. In
short, Sisi possesses neither the status nor the ability to say no to Morsi.
On top of all this, there is the general atmosphere of enmity toward Israel
that prevails among the Egyptian public. The new generals, in contrast to
their predecessors, understand that in the era of the Arab Spring, the
public is a full partner to decision-making in the country, and they feel
the public's hate of Israel.
Actually, both Sisi and Sobhi have been in contact with the Israeli side
more than once, and are well acquainted with their counterparts in Tel Aviv.
This is especially true of Sisi, who was until recently the commander of
Military Intelligence. Both of them acquired an advanced military education
in the West (in Britain and the United States ). However, they are not part
of the group of generals that viewed the Israelis as full partners. At no
stage, not even during the Mubarak period, did Sisi and Sobhi forge ties of
friendship with the Israeli side.
Seven years ago, Sobhi, who until this week was the commander of Egypt's
Third Army, attended the U.S. Army War College (as did Sisi ). In his
master's thesis in strategic studies, he recommended that the United States
withdraw its forces from the Middle East and end what he considered its
one-sided policy regarding Israel's security interests. In many senses, that
thesis (which was first publicized on Twitter by someone called "Arabist" )
reflects the new chief of staff's regional approach.
According to Sobhi, the United States, ironically, defines its Mideast
policy around Israel, which is conducting an "illegitimate occupation." He
argued that the United States must contend with hostile and emotional
response from Arab states, because of its policy on Israel. "The Islamic
religion is strongly interlinked to various degrees with the functioning of
most Arab governments and their respective societies," Sobhi wrote.
His recommendation, seven years ago: The United States should tighten its
relations with Iran. But much has changed in the region since 2005, and it
is not because of what Sobhi wrote that the cooperation between the various
sides will be transformed.
No one noticed
The development that, more than any other, should set off warning bells in
Jerusalem, is the unilateral action taken by the Egyptians in Sinai during
the past few days. Israel had prior knowledge about, and consented to, the
use of some of the military reinforcements that were sent into the peninsula
as well as the warplanes that were employed. But Egypt took action above and
beyond what both sides agreed the Egyptian military needed to do in order to
operate throughout Sinai. It turns out that additional forces were sent in,
almost without anyone noticing, and without Jerusalem's agreement.
While Israel is prattling itself to death on the Iranian issue, the decision
makers here are choosing not to respond to the fact that Egypt is moving
forces into Sinai, contrary to the terms of the peace agreement. It is
possible that the Israeli side prefers to take this lying down for now. In
the final analysis, the purpose of the movement is a positive one: to do
battle against the nests of extremist terrorists who are attacking Egyptian
troops, but have also tried, and will try again, to perpetrate terrorist
attacks against Israeli targets as well.
At the same time, there is apprehension about the trickle of Egyptian forces
into Sinai in numbers that will ultimately be unacceptable to Israel. This
is creating facts on the ground. After sending in these forces, Cairo might
officially request that they be allowed to stay. It's a good guess that a
negative Israeli reply will not exactly prompt the new Egypt or its leader
from the Muslim Brotherhood to quickly remove the troops.
In the meantime, there are a growing number of conspiracy theories being
hatched in Cairo regarding Morsi's decision to dismiss Tantawi. The website
of the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masriyoun reported that Morsi moved quickly to
depose Tantawi because the general was planning a coup for the end of
August. In this case, however, the truth is probably simpler. Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood are out to complete their takeover of the January 2011
revolution.
A blog posted on Wednesday by Jonathan D. Halevi (in both Hebrew and
English ) on the website of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
presented a document purportedly written by an intelligence body in Egypt
and uploaded by an Egyptian site. It claims that the Muslim Brotherhood was
in fact a central player in planning the demonstrations and the revolution,
with the aim of buttressing its standing. The document is said to be dated
January 28, 2011, three days after the start of the demonstrations, and
Morsi's name appears in it repeatedly, as a key figure in planning the
protests and confrontations against the old regime.
The Supreme Muslim Council was a bone in the craw of the Muslim Brotherhood,
and Morsi's move against the two generals removed the final obstacle for the
movement. Although the deputy general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Khairat al-Shater (a former candidate for the country's presidency ) ,
continued to claim this week that the lengthy power failures in Egypt were
part of a domestic plot by those who sought to undermine the revolution, in
many senses there is actually one remaining power center in Egypt today: the
Muslim Brotherhood. The military council, which challenged the movement, has
ceased to exist.
In the end, the movement's supporters will argue, it recouped the powers
that are part and parcel of the presidency. However, just before Western
media outlets begin to declare their admiration for Egypt's magnificent
democracy, it needs to be said that the direction in which the Muslim
brotherhood is leading the country hardly resembles classic democracy. Most
of the media, fearing a confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood, are
parroting the line espoused by the new president. On Wednesday, a
journalist, Yussef al-Qaid, claimed that the new editor of Al Akhbar, a
Muslim Brotherhood appointee, had prevented him from publishing an article
critical of the movement. King Mubarak is gone. Long live King Morsi.
Tip of the dune
Ten days after the start of the Egyptian army's operation in the Sinai
Peninsula, it is shaping up as an exceptional event in Egyptian terms. It is
the most extensive activity by the army in Sinai since the Yom Kippur War 39
years ago.
The Egyptian forces that were sent into northeastern Sinai are operating
with determination in the area of El-Arish and Sheikh Zuweid. They have
killed or arrested a number of wanted individuals belonging to groups
identified with global jihad and also extremists among the local Bedouin
population.
The activity has included battles in the region of the village of al-Jourah
and the confiscation of weapons. The Egyptian authorities have also,
apparently, been able to reach agreements with the sheikhs and other leaders
of the tribal groups in northeastern Sinai about the need take action
against extremists who harmed Egyptian security and killed 17 Egyptian
soldiers in an attack near the Kerem Shalom checkpoint.
However, this is only the tip of the sand dune. The Egyptians are now
focusing their activity in the area of the border with the Gaza Strip. They
have yet to launch the more difficult and complicated campaign to uproot the
armed militants in central Sinai and to act against the tunnels from Sinai
into the Strip. For the time being (and it needs to be emphasized that this
is only the start of the operation ), the Egyptian army is carrying out
actions that are aimed mainly at pacifying domestic public opinion and
creating a semblance of activity.
This is the case with the tunnels, several of which east of the Rafah
crossing were demolished by the Egyptian army (these tunnels are not
considered part of the Hamas network of subterranean passages ). The same
holds true for the searches being carried out in El-Arish and Sheikh Zuweid.
The first goal was to purge the area of terrorist nests.
The question that remains open is what will happen in the second stage. What
will the Egyptians do about the challenge of the tunnels, and how will they
deal with the major problem of central Sinai?
For the moment, at least, the most urgent problem is Jebel Halal. This hilly
region, some 70 or 80 kilometers from El-Arish, was thought by some
archaeologists to be the site of Mount Sinai.
The hills slope into Wadi el Arish and are in the area controlled by the
Tarabin Bedouin tribe. Probably dozens, if not hundreds, of armed
individuals are taking shelter there. The area is studded with nooks and
crannies, burrows and caves, which evoke the Tora Bora caves in eastern
Afghanistan. Armored vehicles cannot be deployed there, and aerial strikes
are unlikely to penetrate the thick cave walls. The only choice is for the
Egyptian army to send in infantry, and steel itself for a large number of
casualties. Until that happens, we will continue to be witness to a war of
attrition between the army and the Islamists.
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